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ABSTRACT 
 
Equity financing in entrepreneurship primarily includes venture capital, corporate venture 
capital, angel investment, crowdfunding and accelerators. We take stock of venture financing 
research to date with two main objectives: a) to integrate, organize and assess the large and 
disparate literature on venture financing; and b) to identify key considerations relevant for the 
domain of venture financing moving forward. The net effect is that organizing and assessing 
existing research in venture financing will assist in launching meaningful, theory-driven research 
as existing funding models evolve and emerging funding models forge new frontiers. 
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A REVIEW AND ROADMAP OF ENTREPRENEURIAL EQUITY FINANCING 
RESEARCH: VENTURE CAPITAL, CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL, ANGEL 
INVESTMENT, CROWDFUNDING AND ACCELERATORS 
 
Entrepreneurs pursuing high-growth potential ventures usually secure financial capital to 
help fuel their endeavors. While young ventures often rely on a mixture of debt and equity 
financing, the literature on high-growth potential startups has largely focused on outside equity 
finance, such as venture capitalists (VCs), corporate venture capitalists (CVCs), angel investors, 
crowdfunding and/or accelerators. Across several disciplines, venture financing continues to 
provide fertile ground for proposing and testing theories within a number of important areas 
across the individual, organizational, and market levels of analysis.  
In light of both the substantial body of research and the emerging trends taking place in the 
field, much is to be gained from an examination of entrepreneurial equity financing in 
consideration of future research needs. As such, the first objective of this paper is to organize and 
review the equity venture financing literature, placing particular emphasis on articles from 2004 
forward. Second, we seek to provide a platform from which to pursue new inquiry and future 
research that facilitates theoretically grounded work in the face of the dynamic entrepreneurial 
financing landscape. Doing so, we begin by offering an overview of the key funding mechanisms 
that comprise the modern equity funding landscape, followed by a brief review of the earliest 
phases of venture financing research starting in the early 1980s through 2003. We then focus on 
the research that has emerged on the different funding mechanisms since 2003. Finally, we give 
significant attention to future research opportunities associated with each source of funding and 
their growing interconnectedness.  
THE EQUITY FUNDING LANDSCAPE 
Entrepreneurial equity investments by VC, CVC, angel investors, and more recently 
crowdfunding and accelerators represent the key sources of capital that fuels innovation and 
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development. Such investments usually entail significant risk but also have the potential for 
substantial upside. While equity investors trade capital for a portion of company ownership, 
several types of equity funding are based on the stage of investment focus, amounts invested, 
strategic objectives, geographic concentration, and the nature of involvement beyond the 
provision of capital. Given this distinctiveness, we offer a brief overview of each and then 
review and assess research on these key forms of equity funding.  
First, VC tends to be the most widely recognized form of equity financing, despite only 
funding a small fraction of startups. VCs raise funds from a set of limited partners (university 
endowments, pension funds, etc.), and seek to provide a return to these investors through 
selective investments into a portfolio of young, innovative companies (Gompers & Lerner, 
2000). VC firms are typically small, geographically-clustered entities, often working closely with 
the ventures in which they invest to provide guidance and value beyond capital (Sapienza, 1992; 
Sørenson, 2007). VCs mainly participate in deals mid to late-stage, recently averaging $6.4 
million per first-time investment (NVCA, 2016), and continue drifting to larger and later-stage 
investments (Hellman & Thiele, 2015). Because VCs provide returns to their limited partners 
within 10 or so years, there is often a focus on realizing timely exits via an acquisition or IPO. 
While exhibiting cyclical ebbs and flows since arising in the 1960s, VCs are currently averaging 
investments of about $32 billion annually (NVCA, 2016).  
Second, CVC denotes the systematic practice by established corporations of making equity 
investments in entrepreneurial ventures. CVC is distinct from traditional VC in that funds are 
invested by arms of corporations as extensions of their primary focus—e.g., Google and 
Samsung. Corporate investors are usually looking to bring long-term value to their firms and 
focus more on early to mid-stage ventures. During the latest cyclical uptick, CVC arms have 
grown from 625 to 1,100 between 2010 to 2014 (Venture Beat, 2014) and provided $7.7 billion 
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into 930 rounds in 2015 (NVCA, 2016). These corporate investors have had a significant impact 
on investee companies by providing capital, complementary assets, shared industry knowledge, 
and access to customers as well as in shaping innovation strategies for their own firms. 
Third, angel investors are accredited individuals who invest their own personal capital into 
young ventures. Angels are often former entrepreneurs who seek to fund and add value/guidance 
to investee firms in their area of expertise. Such individuals tend to take a less formal approach 
to investing, particularly with regard to the level of due diligence conducted and the formality of 
contracts and control involved. Most recently, angels have heightened their impact by forming 
angel investor groups (Kerr et al., 2014) and by providing platforms, both online and in person, 
for individual angels to evaluate and invest in high-potential deal flow collectively (e.g., Tech 
Coast Angels). While historically a highly independent and fragmented market, the angel 
investing landscape is trending toward more centralized angel networks and groups across the 
globe. Often investing at the earliest stages of the venture lifecycle, angels were estimated to 
have invested $25 billion into over 70,000 young ventures in 2015 (Sohl, 2015).  
Finally, and most recently, crowdfunding and accelerators are two emerging forms of equity 
funding mechanisms. Equity crowdfunding is where a large volume of online investors 
contribute smaller amounts for fractions of company ownership (Vulkan et al., 2016). While 
equity crowdfunding initially faced significant legal challenges, it is experiencing rapid growth 
as legal barriers are being relaxed in many countries (Ahlers et al., 2015). Accelerators are 
cohort-based programs that trade a configuration of mentorship, work space, and/or funding, 
often in exchange for equity. The capital provided typically runs from $25k-$150k and is offered 
at the very earliest stages. At its core, entrepreneurs apply for an opportunity to develop (or 
“accelerate”) their concepts on site during a fixed time period (3-6 months). Those accepted are 
provided with an immersive experience that equips entrepreneurs with many of the essential 
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tools required to succeed (Hathaway, 2016). Cohorts conclude with a “demo day,” where 
concepts are pitched to potential investors and stakeholders. Accelerators (e.g., Y-Combinator) 
are proliferating across the globe, increasing from 1 in 2005 to over 500 in 2015 (Shane, 2016). 
Together, the above represents the modern entrepreneurial equity funding landscape. We 
next turn to reviewing the growing body of academic literature that has evolved in this space.    
REVIEW FRAMEWORK AND METHODS 
To review venture financing research, we searched for articles focusing on VC, CVC and 
angel investment. While equity crowdfunding and accelerators are also of recently growing 
interest, there is not enough research at this juncture to constitute a meaningful review; we 
address these in the future research section. The time frame for this study is published research 
from 1980-present. We restricted the boundaries of our word search to the title and abstract for 
specific key words. For VC, we searched for the terms “venture capital,” “venture capitalist(s)” 
and “VC.” For CVC, we searched “corporate venture capital” and “CVC.” For angel investment, 
we searched for “angel” and “informal venture capital.” 
We searched for the relevant articles in leading management, entrepreneurship, finance and 
sociology journals. These included: Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Academy of 
Management Review (AMR), Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), American Journal of 
Sociology (AJS), American Sociological Review (ASR), Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 
(ETP), Journal of Business Venturing (JBV), Journal of Finance (JOF), Journal of Financial 
Economics (JFE), Journal of Management (JOM), Journal of Management Studies (JMS), 
Management Science (MS), Organization Science (OS), Review of Financial Studies (RFS), 
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal (SEJ) and Strategic Management Journal (SMJ). Thus, our 
analysis of venture financing research includes an interdisciplinary set of 16 leading journals.  
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Our search yielded 418 article classifications. Given the size and timespan of the paper set, 
and the variation in equity funding mechanisms, we divided the articles in three key ways. First, 
greater weight is placed on the more recent research. In doing so, we divided the 418 articles into 
two tranches—1980 to 2003 and 2004 to present. The 1980-2003 block covers the venture 
financing field during its time of emergence. We focus the majority of our attention on articles 
from 2004 forward. This allows for a more thorough assessment of the current trends that began 
taking shape in the early 2000s. Second, in offering a more in-depth review of articles published 
from 2004 forward, we divided the review sections by funding models of VC, CVC and angels. 
Third, nested within each funding mechanism, or section, we classified articles across three units 
of analysis: The individual level, the organizational level and the market level (See Table 1).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
--------------------------------- 
VENTURE FINANCING RESEARCH: 1980-2003 
The modern landscape for entrepreneurial finance began emerging in the 1950s and 1960s as 
new technologies became available for commercialization and entrepreneurs started pursuing 
high-growth potential ventures. As equity funding started to gain a foundation by the early 
1980s, scholars began to take note and started to probe the nature of equity financing and how it 
differed from the more traditional sources of capital. Over the last several decades, this research 
has become increasingly prevalent and sophisticated, regularly appearing in a set of leading 
journals that span several disciplines. This section provides an overview of the earlier stages of 
this work by highlighting many of the impactful articles that appeared in the period from 1980-
2003. Notably, aside from a small handful of CVC and angel investment articles, research on VC 
comprises the vast majority of this early research—thus constituting the majority of our focus.   
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Early articles on VC were often descriptive of how the process works, the role of key players, 
and some of the important concepts and frameworks that proved foundational for this developing 
stream of research (e.g., Bygrave, 1988; Elango et al., 1995; Florida & Kenney, 1988; Gorman & 
Sahlman, 1989; Robinson, 1988). Most of this early research relied heavily on primary field 
research complemented by Venture Economics’ secondary data. Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) 
characterized VC deals as being methodical and identified five sequential steps of deal 
origination, deal screening, deal evaluation, deal structuring and post-investment activities. They 
also modeled expected returns based on market attractiveness and product differentiation as well 
as perceived risk based primarily on the capabilities of the management team and environmental 
threats (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).    
MacMillan et al. (1986, 1987) also made some important early contributions by identifying 
the criteria that VCs use in evaluating prospective investments to distinguish between successful 
and unsuccessful ventures. MacMillan et al. (1989) examined how VCs remain involved in their 
funded investments. Similarly, Timmons and Bygrave (1986) highlighted the non-financial or 
managerial contributions that VCs bring to the funded ventures, demonstrating that backing a 
venture was just as much or more about managing and providing valuable input to the 
entrepreneurs as about providing financial capital. In a complementary article, Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989) asked “What do venture capitalists do?” and noted among other things that VCs 
spend about half of their time monitoring approximately nine portfolio ventures. In the most-
cited VC article from this era, Sahlman (1990) described the structure and governance of VCs. 
Given the fledgling nature of VC organizations, they were compared and contrasted with 
mainline public corporations as well as with leveraged buyout organizations. Barry and 
colleagues (1990) also brought attention to the specialized investments of VCs, highlighting their 
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role in shaping and governing funded ventures. These articles delineated how VCs approach the 
potential funding of a new venture and how they help develop the ventures in which they invest.   
Linkages were also made between VC funding and economic growth. Timmons and Bygrave 
(1986) characterized VC investments as encouraging high-technology ventures, suggesting that 
such investments were an engine of innovation and high growth in the US. Another important 
article with market-level implications was Bygrave’s (1987) work on syndicated investments by 
VCs. This work brought significant attention to the extensive networks that VCs use to share 
information on potential deals as well as to manage their financial risk by co-investing.   
Early work on CVC also tended initially to be descriptive. Winters et al. (1988) offer a 
general survey of the CVC industry, and an overview of why and how corporations might benefit 
from CVC. Rind (1981) describes the evolution and state of CVC, and discusses the implications 
associated with several types of CVC strategies: new ventures division, wholly-owned ventures, 
new-style joint ventures, direct VC and outside partnerships. Additional studies also explored 
various approaches and outcomes of CVC investment activity, recommending solutions for 
improving investment success (Siegel et al., 1988). Early research on angel investment follows a 
similar path, covering the general angel market, discussing its scale, efficiency and patterns 
(Harrison & Mason, 1992; Wetzel, 1987), as well as profiling investor attributes, attitudes and 
behaviors (Aram, 1989; Fiet, 1996; Freear et al., 1994). Surveying angel investors, Haar et al. 
(1989) also address the general market, but also explore screening criteria, noting key similarities 
and differences from formal VC investors.  
As the domain of venture financing continued its evolution, more theory-driven work 
emerged—particularly with VC research. The principal-agent framework, for example, emerged 
as a common way to characterize the investor-entrepreneur relationship (Amit et al., 1990; Fiet, 
1995; Sapienza & Gupta, 1994; Van Osnabrugge, 1998). Elitzur and Gavious (2003) modeled 
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moral hazard issues that arise as entrepreneurs, angels and VCs interact. Further examinations of 
the contractual arrangements between VCs and entrepreneurs became a fruitful stream of 
research (e.g., Black & Gilson, 1998; Gompers, 1995; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003; Sapienza & 
Gupta, 1994). Related work continued to establish theoretical foundations for understanding the 
extent to which VCs add value and professionalize portfolio companies beyond that of financial 
contributions (Hellman & Puri, 2002; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996).  
When VCs get involved, there is a certification effect that lessens the cost of going public 
and increases the net proceeds to the offering firm (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). Complementary 
to the insights provided on the certification role of VCs and the networking of VCs to invest 
through syndication (Bygrave, 1987), important work emerged on the inter-organizational 
networks of young companies and VCs (Sørenson & Stuart, 2001). Entrepreneurial ventures 
often benefited by endorsements from reputable exchange partners as reflected in reaching IPO 
more quickly and obtaining higher valuations than firms without such endorsements (Stuart et 
al., 1999). Founders who have relationships that provide access to additional resource 
endowments and investors, it was quickly understood, are more likely to receive funding (Shane 
& Stuart, 2002). Of course, some relationships matter more than others, and they likely vary by 
the types of uncertainty (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). Additional work leveraged theory to open up 
the decision-making processes of investors, acknowledging the irrational and often biased nature 
of such decisions (Shepherd, 1999; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).  
Through this overview of some of the early research, it is clear that important foundations 
were laid. Building from these works, we now address how researchers have pushed forward 
with this important frontier.  
VENTURE FINANCING RESEARCH: 2004-PRESENT 
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Research from 2004 to the present expands upon the work above, diving deeper into VC 
while channeling greater attention to additional types of funding. This research includes a total of 
263 paper classifications. We now turn to VC, CVC and angel research within this time period, 
reviewing research at the individual, organizational and market levels. Further, financing 
mechanisms are reviewed in this order, paralleling the scholarly impact (indicated by citation 
count and article volume) of articles falling within each. 
VENTURE CAPITAL 
VCs—professional investors funding portfolios of potentially high-growth ventures—have 
had a transformative impact on the modern entrepreneurial landscape. Thus this component of 
the financing landscape has drawn more research attention than any other form of equity 
financing; a robust body of research has examined topics across the individual, organizational 
and market levels, with the greatest attention being paid to the organizational level. In total, VC 
research represents over three-fourths of the papers under consideration.  
VC Individual Level 
From the VCs’ perspective, individual-level research largely focuses on the ways investors 
evaluate prospective deals. Related research takes the perspective of the entrepreneur and 
focuses on why some ventures are funded while others are not. A third stream of research 
focuses on the VC-entrepreneur dyad and how both parties interrelate.  
VCs. Investigations into how VCs evaluate prospective opportunities have attracted 
significant attention. Early research in this stream established self-reported criteria that VCs use 
to make decisions (e.g., management team, market characteristics). In painting a more nuanced 
picture, research has since progressed to draw attention to the subjective, interactive and 
contingent nature of VC evaluations that defy rational formulas and rigid approaches (Kirsch et 
al., 2009; Petty & Gruber, 2011). For example, underscoring the importance of individual-level 
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difference considerations, novice VCs tend to focus on the qualifications of individual venture 
team members, while more experienced VCs emphasize broader team cohesion (Franke et al., 
2008). Other research evaluates the perceived motivations of the entrepreneurs—entrepreneurial 
passion—and the preparedness of the team, indicating that preparedness more positively impacts 
decisions to invest than did passion (Chen et al., 2009). Further, Matusik et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that a VC’s values influence evaluations of the management team, while other 
advances delineate tradeoffs between perceived control and the prestige of the management 
team, suggesting that VCs are more willing to accept less control as the prestige of the 
management team increases (Drover et al., 2014a). Extant research also highlights VC decision 
making from a longitudinal vantage point, where the importance of decision criteria varies across 
evaluative stages (e.g., preliminary screening, due diligence, etc.) (Petty & Gruber, 2011).  
Overall, progress in this area emphasizes that VCs utilize multiple, interacting data sources 
and commonly rely on inferential logic more than on the planning documents produced by the 
entrepreneurial team (Kirsch et al., 2009). Promising advances are coming from models probing 
cognitive processes that capture the subjective, contingent and multi-faceted nature of VC 
decision making. 
Entrepreneurs. VC research has also probed interesting angles involving individual 
entrepreneurs. Kaplan et al. (2012) examines the general ability and the execution skills of CEOs 
in privately funded ventures and finds both types of human capital positively related to 
subsequent performance. Schwienbacher (2007) categorizes entrepreneurs into three types—life-
style, serial and pure profit-maximizing—and finds the category of entrepreneur to affect the 
source of financing pursued. Ueda (2004) considers the characteristics and trade-offs associated 
with the entrepreneurs’ pursuit of VC versus banks, where factors such as strength of intellectual 
property and collateral emerge as important considerations. Ethical perceptions of entrepreneurs 
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have also garnered some attention: Entrepreneurs’ perception of a prospective investor’s ethical 
reputation impacts their willingness to partner, indicating that entrepreneurs become increasingly 
tolerant of less ethical VCs as the need for funding becomes more severe (Drover et al., 2014b). 
Moreover, in selecting a VC, it has also been shown that entrepreneurs are willing to pay a 
premium to partner with more reputable VCs by way of a discounted valuation (Hsu, 2004). 
The Investor–Entrepreneur Dyad. In addition to the above, the relationship between VCs 
and the entrepreneurs that they fund also holds important implications for venture outcomes. 
From a funding standpoint, Franke et al. (2006) find that VCs tend to look more favorably on 
teams that have training and professional experience similar to themselves. Bruns and colleagues 
(2008) find that similarities between the specific and general human capital of the funding agent 
and the entrepreneurs are both significant indicators of funding. In a similar vein, Bengtsson and 
Hsu (2015) find that co-ethnicity between the entrepreneur and VC partner increases the 
likelihood of VC investments. However, they also find that shared ethnicity results in less 
desirable financial outcomes. Murnieks et al. (2011) examine the way entrepreneurs and VCs 
“think” as reflected in their decision-making processes and find that VCs tend to favor new 
investment opportunities led by entrepreneurs who think in ways similar to themselves. 
Accordingly, it seems that investors are attracted to entrepreneurs who are like them in some 
important ways. Clearly the influence of similarity biases is important for understanding how 
VCs decide whether to invest in specific deals. 
VC Organizational Level 
 VC research at the organizational level is a central area of inquiry in the entrepreneurial 
finance literature. A significant portion of this focus centers on VCs mitigation of risk, the 
effects of VC firm intermediation on portfolio companies, and the certification role VCs provide. 
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VC Risk Mitigation Strategies. Given the high potential of goal conflicts between investors 
and entrepreneurs, coupled with possible adverse selection, VCs regularly utilize risk mitigation 
strategies to manage their investments (Cumming, 2008; Hellman, 2006; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2004; Tian, 2011). Much of the literature addressing agency concerns from the perspective of the 
VC explores various cash flow rights, control rights and incentives, given that such mechanisms 
are increasingly used when risks and complexity are higher (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004).  
In volatile environments with asymmetric information, VCs regularly utilize multi-stage 
investment vehicles (i.e., providing capital in a series of allocations over time, versus one lump 
sum) (Grenadier & Malenko, 2011; Li, 2008; Tian, 2011). In so doing, VCs can limit their 
exposure to both agency and developmental risks, deciding whether to continue investing, 
withdraw or even renegotiate terms/valuation at various stages (Guler, 2007; Li & Chi, 2013; 
Tian, 2011). The structure and approach to staging can vary; for example, VCs tend to invest 
through more rounds in smaller increments when there is greater geographic distance between a 
VC firm and the investee firm (Tian, 2011). That said, due to intraorganizational politics as well 
as pressure from co-investors and limited partners (escalating commitment) (Guler, 2007) VCs 
do not always terminate poor performing investments.  
VCs regularly utilize other contractual mechanisms, such as stock options (Arcot, 2014), 
covenants (Bengtsson, 2011), convertible securities (Hellman, 2006), board representation 
(Wijbenga et al., 2007), and active monitoring of the management team post-investment 
(Yoshikawa et al., 2004). Recent work on security design in VC contracts emphasizes the need 
for more context-specific research into the ways various types of securities are utilized by 
investors (Burchardt et al., 2016). While it is suggested that differences in tax regimes and 
institutional practices explain some of these differences, related research also predicts that the 
use of convertible preferred equity can reduce information asymmetries about entrepreneurial 
Equity Financing Review   15 
 
   
abilities and better align entrepreneur-investor interests (Arcot, 2014). When fixed payoffs are 
higher, investors often utilize contractual covenants to try to control behaviors (Bengtsson, 
2011); still, the enforceability of these contracts is contingent upon either investor’s reprisal 
abilities (Lu et al., 2006) or the institutional environment in which the investor is operating (Li & 
Zahra, 2012). Overall, it is often recognized that VC control tends to decrease as the investee 
company performance improves over time. 
VCs also use syndication as a way to mitigate risk (Manigart et al., 2006). Here, multiple 
VCs invest alongside one another to form a syndicate (Gu & Lu, 2014; Keil et al., 2010). 
Through syndication, access to investment opportunities are shared and often jointly vetted 
(Hochberg et al., 2007), and thus VCs can spread their investment risks across a larger pool of 
promising deals as opposed to investing larger amounts into a smaller number. Syndication has 
well-documented performance consequences—particularly with regard to one’s network position 
(Hochberg et al., 2007; Sørenson and Stuart, 2008).  
VC Intermediation. A robust stream of work investigates important questions regarding the 
role of VCs in selecting and adding value to portfolio companies (e.g., strategic guidance), and 
exploring important contingencies therein (Chemmanur et al., 2011; Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; 
Sørenson, 2007). It is widely recognized that VC investments are inherently a two-sided 
matching process: high-quality VCs search for high-quality portfolio companies (Sørenson, 
2007). The impact and outcomes of VC involvement on portfolio companies, though, varies.  
The effectiveness of VC intermediation activities on new ventures appears to vary based on 
how outcomes are measured. Fitza et al. (2009) estimate that VCs contribute about 11% to 
variance in inter-round valuation changes of the portfolio companies in which they invest. They 
also find no evidence of VCs’ ability to select ventures with higher potential valuation, but do 
note that the influence of VC intermediation activities on firm valuation is more pronounced 
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during the early investment period. Related research reports that VCs more likely select firms 
with higher growth potential and that VC intermediation activities increase the growth of factor 
productivity in firms by 18% (e.g., revenue growth—Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 
2013). Importantly, this research also estimates that even firms that were not originally backed 
by VCs would have experienced approximately 5% increase in factor productivity growth had 
VCs invested in the ventures (Chemmanur et al., 2011). At the same time, other research reports 
that VC-backed firms achieve higher levels of revenue growth, but not necessarily higher levels 
of profitability (Puri & Zarutski, 2012). Puri and Zarutskie (2012) observe that VC-backed 
ventures experience more rapid growth and are more likely to survive for 5 years as opposed to 
non-VC-backed firms, but beyond 5 years, this survival likelihood appears to reverse.   
Extant research also zooms in on contingent relationships, where a meta-analysis of 76 
samples (36,567 VC-backed firms) suggests that positive performance effects largely hinge on 
situational factors such as stage of development and industry (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Another 
contingency accounting for variation in performance is heterogeneity across VC firms (Dimov 
and Shepherd, 2005; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Sørenson, 2007). The abilities of VCs to evaluate 
potential investment targets and add value are not always equal; Sørenson (2007) reveals that VC 
firms with greater experience are more likely to realize IPO exits than their lesser-experienced 
counterparts—through selection and influence (though to differing degrees). Adopting a human 
capital approach, Dimov and Shepherd (2005) find that VC firms comprised of higher levels of 
general human capital had a positive impact on portfolio company IPOs, while surprisingly the 
specific human capital of VCs did not impact venture outcomes. 
 Other work establishes that both high- and low-reputation VC firms influence portfolio firm 
efficiency, but cast differential effects (Chemmanur et al., 2011). Moreover, scholars have also 
focused on contingencies associated with the investee firm: The value VCs provide may be 
Equity Financing Review   17 
 
   
greater among lower-quality ventures (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Although team makeup and 
capabilities play a key role in attracting VC funding (Beckman et al., 2007), the value of VCs 
may be greater for firms with incomplete teams. The number of investee companies (portfolio 
size) is also likely to influence the constructive coaching and value provided by VCs given the 
division of time, attention and resources (Fulghieri & Sevilir, 2009).  
Other studies point to a less-positive or mixed view of the value that VCs bring (Busenitz et 
al., 2004; Baum and Silverman, 2004); Busenitz and colleagues (2004), for example, tracked the 
performance of VC-backed companies over a ten-year period and report that the strategic 
guidance provided by VCs plays no role in increasing the odds of a successful exit. Taken 
together, significant attention has been paid to disentangling the relative value provided by VCs.  
Certification. Although much research revolves around the VC impact and value-added 
services on portfolio firm performance, other studies explore the certification value of VC ties on 
portfolio company performance—especially during exit events like IPOs (Pollock et al., 2010). 
Backing by higher-reputation VCs is related to more favorable exits, and the share prices of these 
companies is frequently higher than non-VC-backed companies (Nahata, 2008). The certification 
effects of VC ties also appear to enhance the formation of alliance networks both among VC 
firms and among portfolio companies (Gu & Lu, 2014; Hoehn-Weiss & Karim, 2014; Lindsey, 
2008). Additional research suggests these firms are subject to underpricing as a result of VC 
grandstanding (Lee & Wahal, 2004), which may positively affect future VC deal flow, but 
generally reduces the gains to the original owners. Clearly, VC involvement can communicate 
important social signals, but the complexities of such activity are still being teased out.   
VC Market Level 
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VC market-level research falls broadly into two categories. One group focuses on exogenous 
(market) factors that shape VC organizational level decisions and outcomes, and so related to the 
themes raised in the prior section. Another examines country level outcomes associated with VC.  
Exogenous (market) factors and organizational level action. VC investment decisions are 
shaped by where others are investing (Hochberg et al, 2010; Inderst & Muller, 2004; Nanda & 
Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; Sørenson & Stuart, 2008), as well as the presence of government funding, 
though in ways that vary by country (e.g., Guerini & Quas, 2016; Munari & Toschi, 2015). 
Additionally, the development of the legal environment impacts deal screening and syndication 
behavior (Cumming et al., 2010). The institutional context also affects syndicate patterns (Gu & 
Lu, 2014) and the amounts and timing of investments (Dai et al., 2012), as well as post-
investment governance decisions (e.g., Cumming et al., 2010).   
In terms of outcomes, cultural and institutional distance can negatively affect successful exits 
(Li et al., 2014) and network ties can ameliorate negative effects associated with cultural and 
geographic distance (Jaaskelainen & Maula, 2014). Other work (in Asia) indicates that 
investments that have both foreign and local VCs are more likely to have successful exits than 
those with only domestic or foreign firms (Dai et al., 2012), while the type of equity investment 
and associated levels of retained equity can affect IPO performance in different institutional 
contexts. Bruton et al. (2010) find that VC-retained equity in the UK context is positively related 
to IPO valuations, while angel-retained equity is positively associated to IPO valuations in 
France, suggesting the legal traditions of these two countries account for such differences. 
Overall, the level of activity in a market and formal institutions conducive to markets 
generally have positive effects on VC entry, involvement, and outcomes (Sørenson & Stuart, 
2008; Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; Cummings et al., 2010), while cultural and institutional 
distance are generally negatively related to successful outcomes (e.g., Li et al., 2014). 
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Foreignness and relative level of institutional development in a VC’s home country may affect 
VC decisions on where and how to invest (Gu & Lu, 2014), and different forms of risk capital 
may be optimal in different institutional contexts (Bruton et al., 2010). Additionally, syndication 
between home and host country VC firms generally yields positive outcomes, especially in 
contexts with weaker formal institutions (e.g., Jaaskelainen & Maula, 2014).   
Country level outcomes Government incentives, formal institutions, and informal 
institutions can shape VC investment patterns at the country level of analysis. Extant work on 
incentives has examined government initiatives aimed at providing VC. For example, Cumming 
and MacIntosh (2006) find evidence that a Canadian government venture vehicle crowds out 
private venture money. On the other hand, the government-run IIF program in Australia, which 
is somewhat unusual relative to other government incentives in that it focuses on government-
private sector investments, has largely been successful (Cumming, 2007). Overall, results from 
seeding the VC market with government funds are mixed.  
Recent research on formal institutions finds that institutions that enable economic integration 
in the form of a common market and currency positively relate to cross-border VC flows in these 
countries (Alhorr et al., 2008) and that formal institutions as represented in the World 
Governance Index (e.g., rule of law, IP protection, political stability, accountability, control over 
corruption) have a positive effect on country-level volume of VC investment (Li & Zahra, 2012). 
Further, developed VC markets may attenuate the negative effect that stringent bankruptcy laws 
have on entrepreneurship levels (Lee et al., 2007). 
The reality that strong formal institutions can be lacking, especially in emerging economies, 
has led to work that highlights how networks can act as substitutes for strong formal institutions 
in some country contexts, encouraging VC activity (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006). Further, patterns 
of migration between countries can affect cross-border investment levels (Iriyama & Madhavan, 
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2010), and the nature of social networks can shape funding patterns of early-stage ventures and 
governance of those ventures (Bruton et al., 2005), reinforcing the role that informal social 
relationships can play in driving VC investment across borders.   
Moreover, informal institutions in the form of values and norms affect country-level VC 
patterns. Uncertainty avoidance, for example, moderates the role of formal institutions on 
country levels of VC investment (Li & Zahra, 2012), and the value placed on entrepreneurship 
can shape funding patterns of early stage ventures and their governance (Bruton et al., 2005).    
The findings at the country level indicate that government incentives yield mixed results, 
while market-based formal institutions and personal connections positively affect VC investment 
levels. Further, theoretical work suggests that while many macro-level efforts have been aimed at 
developing risk capital markets as a means of generating robust entrepreneurial ecosystems, such 
efforts are insufficient if they are not also accompanied by contributory factors such as novel 
ideas, role models, leadership, and access to large markets (Venkataraman, 2004). Though this 
theoretical work conceptualizes VC market activities as a separate factor in entrepreneurial 
ecosystem development, the legitimacy and value placed on entrepreneurship may actually be a 
necessary condition for the development of VC markets themselves (e.g., Bruton et al., 2005).  
CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL 
The impact of CVC investing—where existing corporations seek minority equity stakes in 
young ventures—has triggered a growing body of research. Scholars have investigated a number 
of important topics in this emerging space, predominately at the organizational level. Across 
venture financing papers identified as part of our article set, CVC accounts for around 10%.   
CVC Individual Level 
Only a handful of CVC studies exist at the individual level. The lacuna of work is partially 
due to limited data and partially due to the focus on organization level dynamics prevalent in the 
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corporate setting. Dokko and Gaba (2012) as well as Hill and Birkinshaw (2014) discuss CVC 
personnel and their career backgrounds while Souitaris and colleagues (2012, 2014) bring 
qualitative insights into CVCs’ mindsets and investment rational. Moreover, Dushnitsky and 
Shapira (2010) document individual compensation schemes and their impact on subsequent 
investment practices.   
CVC Organizational Level 
 Research at the organizational level falls into four main categories: studies examining 
antecedents to CVC decisions, those that examine the structure of the CVC unit itself, those that 
look at CVC outcomes, and finally studies that examine CVC from the perspective of the firm 
receiving the investment.  
Antecedents. The decision to engage in VC investment is affected by both economic and 
behavioral considerations. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) view CVC investment as part of a 
firm’s optimal innovation strategy in which firms weigh the marginal innovative output of CVC 
activity against that of internal R&D. They find that industry-level factors (i.e., technology 
ferment and patenting activity, role of complementary assets, and IP regime) as well as firm-
level resources (i.e., absorptive capacity, cash flow availability) stimulate CVC activity. 
Additional work confirms the role of the aforementioned industry and firm-level factors and 
points to a subtle interaction among the two (Basu et al., 2011); while industry technological 
ferment and resource-rich firms are two factors associated with higher CVC activity, resource-
rich firms are less—rather than more—likely to pursue CVC in industries that experience 
ferment. Relatedly, a firm is more likely to undertake CVC, rather than M&A activity, in the face 
of high exogenous uncertainty (i.e., when market uncertainty is high) (Tong & Li, 2011). 
There are also behavioral drivers of these venturing activities. CVC practices have diffused 
via contagion from VC firms and then within an industry population (Gaba & Meyer, 2008).  
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Additionally, when innovation performance is above aspiration levels, a firm is less likely to 
initiate or continue existing CVC activities and is also less likely to launch a CVC unit when 
performance is below aspirations (Gaba & Bhattacharya, 2012). 
CVC Unit. CVC activity is situated within a part of the corporate organization. Extant work 
studies four facets of this unit’s activity: objectives, structure, staffing, and salary. The objective 
of corporate investors received significant attention in early studies. Some firms pursue CVC to 
secure financial gains in a manner similar to independent VC funds while many CVC units 
pursue strategic benefits for their parent firm. These may take the form of exposure to novel 
technologies, access to complementary products and services, entry to new markets and 
geographies and so on (Chesbrough, 2002; Keil, 2004; Keil et al., 2008a).  
CVCs also vary by the structure of the unit (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Hill et al., 2009), 
the personnel it employs (Dokko & Gaba, 2012; Souitaris et al., 2012; Souitaris & Zerbinati, 
2014), and incentives offered (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010; Hill et al., 2009). First, there is 
substantial variation in CVC structures (Hill et al., 2009). Some CVC units follow VC funds. 
They are structurally separated from the parent corporation, manage a dedicated pool of capital, 
and have full investment discretion. Others are embedded within a business unit and request 
approval and funding on a deal-by-deal basis. The former structure is associated with greater 
success in realizing financial objectives, whereas the latter is associated with strategic gains. 
Second, human resource strategies vary. As a corporate in-house VC arm, some units are 
staffed by long-term corporate employees. These units commonly pursue fit with internal 
stakeholders (e.g., business units) (Souitaris et al., 2012; Souitaris & Zerbinati, 2014), and their 
portfolio companies are likely to be acquired and assimilated by the parent firm (Dokko & Gaba, 
2012). Other units hire career VCs. Accordingly, they seek legitimacy with external stakeholders 
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(i.e., independent VCs), and their portfolio companies are more likely to achieve financial 
returns. Taken together, the past career of CVC personnel shapes their views and practices. 
Third, incentive schemes are important (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010). VCs often share in the 
financial success of their portfolio companies. They can expect windfalls in the millions of 
dollars through carried interest; however, pressures to maintain pay-equality across the 
corporation imply that many corporate ventures capitalists receive little more than straight salary. 
Consequently, incentive schemes are often adopted with little regard to CVC objectives or 
staffing. This can lead to conservative investment practices (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010) and 
undermines the performance of the unit as a whole (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010; Dushntisky & 
Shaver, 2009; Hill et al., 2009). 
Outcomes of CVC investment. CVC investments interact with a firm’s alliance and 
acquisition activities and can affect its innovation outcomes and financial performance.   
Strategic alliances and joint ventures—as well as CVC—yield the greatest innovation 
contribution when targeting partners in related industries (Keil et al., 2008b). Moreover, a 
comparison of CVC-investing firms to non-investing peers reveals that the former produces 
higher rates of innovation (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). Along these lines, evidence from the 
medical device industry illustrates that parent-firms’ products incorporate innovations from their 
portfolio companies (Smith & Shah, 2013). Also, the contribution of CVC activity to patenting 
rates increases linearly with the depth of involvement of the CVC with its portfolio companies 
(Wadwha & Kotha, 2006), and exhibits an inverted U-shape relationship to the overall diversity 
of the portfolio (Wadhwa et al., 2016). CVC relationships are also associated with timely 
attention to emerging technological discontinuities (Maula et al., 2013).  
Hill and Birkinshaw (2014) found success to be dependent on a unit’s ability to build strong 
relationships internally (i.e., with senior executives as well as business unit managers) and 
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externally (i.e., with independent VC funds). There are also direct relationships between VC 
firms and CVCs. These relationships facilitate access to favorable investment opportunities and 
afford learning of investment practices (Hill et al., 2009; Souitaris & Zerbinati, 2014), but the 
resources of CVC firms can substitute for their lack of prior centrality and allow them rapidly to 
gain central positions in VC syndicates (Keil et al., 2010). 
Further, CVC investments can affect strategic alliance formation. For example, an inverted 
U-shaped relationship exists between a firm’s CVC investments and its alliance formation 
(Dushnitsky & Lavie, 2010). In addition, a prior CVC relationship between a corporation and a 
start-up increases the likelihood the two will subsequently enter a strategic alliance (Van de 
Vrande & Vanhaverbeke, 2013). Mathews (2006) advances an alternative view and predicts that 
a CVC investment will follow, rather than lead to, a strategic alliance.    
CVC also affects acquisition activity. Interestingly, Benson and Ziedonis (2010) find that 
based on acquisition premia, acquirers can be worse off when acquiring startups they have 
previously funded. They also find a positive contribution to the firm’s overall M&A strategy. 
Specifically, they find a positive CVC-M&A association which is strengthened for firms with (a) 
a dedicated CVC unit, or (b) an intense CVC budget relative to internal R&D. 
Finally, CVC may have an impact on financial performance. The performance of the CVC 
unit varies with a large number of units experiencing substantial negative returns and only some 
delivering top-tier returns (Allen & Hevert, 2007). Firms that engage in CVC for strategic 
objectives contribute more to overall parent firm financial performance. In contrast, those that 
pursue VC-like objectives can erode the parent’s performance (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006). 
Additionally, there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship between CVC portfolio diversity and 
corporate financial performance (Yang et al., 2014).    
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Startup’s Perspective & Performance. To understand fully the CVC phenomenon, one has 
to consider the startup’s perspective. Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009) note that the decision to 
undertake an investment from an industry incumbent is not a trivial issue. On the one hand, a 
corporate investor may offer multiple benefits. On the other hand, the corporation may imitate 
the invention. As a result, entrepreneurs may forego CVCs altogether and pursue funding from a 
VC. Indeed, Dushnitsky and Shaver find that CVC investment is less likely in the face of 
heightened imitation concerns, namely when (a) the two are prospective competitors in the same 
industry and (b) the industry IP regime is weak. A survey of startup CEOs further corroborates 
these dynamics (Maula et al., 2009). A startup is more likely to interact with its corporate 
investor, and less likely to adopt relationship safeguards, when the pair pursues complementary 
(rather than potentially competing) offerings.   
There is also some evidence as to the impact on startup’s ultimate performance. CVC-funded 
startups perform at least as well as their VC-backed peers. The positive CVC effect is strongest 
when the startup is well-positioned to take advantage of corporate complementary assets. When 
that is the case, CVC-backed startups are more likely to go public (Park & Steensma, 2012), less 
likely to experience underpricing at IPO (Wang & Wan, 2013), and are more likely to exhibit a 
higher rate of innovation output (Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016; Chemmanur et al., 2014).   
CVC Market Level  
CVC research at the market level focuses on the trends and broader outcomes of CVC 
investment activity. Research suggests that over the past 50 years, CVC exhibits highly cyclical 
patterns, both in terms of total investment amounts as well as in terms of the number of firms 
that engage in CVC. Studying CVC at the aggregate level, scholars have found, for example, that 
an increase in the total R&D expenditures within an industry is associated with a greater number 
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of CVC investments in that industry (Sahaym et al., 2010). Notably, CVC is increasingly 
becoming a global phenomenon with many impactful CVC investors outside the USA or Europe. 
  Next, and equally importantly, the adoption of CVC practices is part of a broader transition 
in corporate R&D strategies, shifting away from an exclusively internal effort and towards 
embracing external sources of innovations (also known as Open Innovation). Put differently, 
many established firms pursue CVC not merely as a way to generate high financial returns, but 
rather as a critical vehicle to engage and nurture a relationships with an external community: that 
of innovative entrepreneurial ventures. Indeed, there is evidence that a firm’s CVC activity is 
associated with its allocation of resources towards innovation input (i.e., R&D spending) as well 
as its innovation outputs (i.e., patenting output; Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005b)). Because focus 
is strategic rather than financial, it is therefore not surprising that a notable number of CVC units 
have persisted across several cycles of boom-and-bust in the VC industry. 
Institutions and regulations that affect innovation-oriented entrepreneurship play a role in 
driving Fortune Global 500 to adopt CVC (Da Gbadji et al., 2015). Companies in countries with 
a developed market for early-stage investments are more likely to engage in CVC, while costly 
personal bankruptcy regulations are associated with lower uptake of CVC practices. 
Interestingly, local conditions have little impact on the degree of internationalization (i.e., 
investment in startups based in foreign innovation hubs). Also, as noted earlier, proliferation and 
success of VC funds is an important factor in firms’ adoption of CVC (Gaba & Meyer, 2008), 
and startups may forego CVC and opt for VC in institutional contexts when imitation concerns 
are heightened (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Maula et al., 2009).  
ANGEL INVESTMENT 
Angel investors—individuals investing their own capital independently or through angel 
groups—are playing an increasingly important role in funding young, high-growth-potential 
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ventures offering some of the earliest stages of funding. While the influence of angel investment 
is substantial, it has attracted only minimal research attention (Huang & Pearce, 2015; Wiltbank 
et al., 2009). Studies investigating angel investment represent just under 10% of the articles in 
our paper set. Kerr et al. (2014, p. 21) argued that “Angel investors have received much less 
attention than venture capitalists, despite the fact that some estimates suggest that these investors 
are as important for high-potential startup investments as are venture capital firms ....”  
Angel Individual level 
 Angel research has taken an interest in individual investor decisions, in particular the internal 
processes and approaches of angel investment decision making (Wiltbank et al., 2009). Maxwell 
et al. (2011) found that angels utilize cognitive processes that tend to be stage-dependent: First, 
heuristic shortcuts are employed to pare down the large number of prospective opportunities 
(elimination by aspects), and a more in-depth and systematic evaluative approach is then utilized 
to assess a smaller subset of ventures. Huang and Pearce (2015) argued that angels rely on 
intuition, heuristic-based reasoning, and that intuitive evaluations more accurately led to 
selecting higher-success investments. Investigations into the role of individual-level investor 
characteristics have begun to show that these characteristics influence the interpretation of 
evaluative criteria (Mitteness et al., 2012). Additional research links the angel’s approach to 
investment outcomes, finding that an investor emphasizing control logic (i.e., attempting to 
control the future) versus prediction logic (i.e., attempting to predict the future) in evaluations 
negatively correlates with an angel’s investment losses (Wiltbank et al., 2009). These studies 
together advance the nexus of investment opportunities under evaluation and the corresponding 
cognitive processes that comprise the investor’s assessment.   
The entrepreneurs in the angel funding context have received limited attention. Inquiry here 
has sought to understand both economic and behavioral motives that drive the entrepreneurs’ 
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pursuit of angel capital. Fairchild (2011) explores the tradeoffs that entrepreneurs face between 
pursuing angel and VC funding, considering the consequences therein. Other research takes a 
dyadic approach, simultaneously exploring both individual angel and entrepreneur interactions. 
Such work establishes that conflict influences each party’s intention to exit (Collewaert, 2012), 
and the innovation levels that result (Collewaert & Sapienza, 2014). Bammens and Collewaert 
(2014) explore intra-team trust perceptions between individual angels and lead entrepreneurs, 
establishing that such perceptions play a role in shaping performance evaluations.  
Angel Organizational Level 
Angel research at the organizational level examines both angel investment organizations (i.e., 
angel groups) as well as the entrepreneurial organizations that receive angel funding. Angel 
group research, while only recently emerging, has begun exploring group decision criteria. 
Carpentier and Suret (2015) articulate some differences between the processes and criteria 
utilized by angel groups and individual angels, finding angel groups tend to focus more on risks 
associated with market/execution than on agency risks and are more concerned with exit. Other 
research investigates the gender composition of angel groups, delineating ways in which 
variations in group composition influence investment likelihood (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2011). 
Angel group research also examines the impact of angel group involvement on investee 
organizations. This research indicates that funding from certain angel groups can influence 
venture performance. For example, Kerr et al. (2014) found that organizations that sought and 
received angel group funding (versus ventures that sought funding, but were narrowly rejected) 
tend to exhibit superior performance. In a related vein, Dutta and Folta (2016) explored how an 
organization’s innovation activity and exit is impacted differently by angel group versus VC 
involvement, offering a first comparison of effects resulting from angel group involvement and 
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other established players. They found, for example, that VC-backed ventures produce higher 
levels of innovation and commercialize faster.  
Relatedly, considering the investee organization, Bruton et al. (2010) demonstrate that angel 
investors provide “value-enhancing effects” that are manifest in IPO performance (Bruton et al., 
2009). Regarding organizational slack resources, angel involvement can positively impact the 
relationship between certain slack resources and performance (Vanacker et al., 2013).  
Angel Market Level 
Angel research at the market level compares and contrasts angel markets with other 
mechanisms, such as VCs, in an effort to understand how these markets differ as well as interact 
with one another. Hellman and Thiele (2015), for example, argue that the angel and VC markets 
are “friends,” where angels provide VCs with a source of deal flow, while VCs provide needed 
follow-on funding. Still, these markets are simultaneously “foes” in that angel and VC 
collaborations often clash around valuations, value-add, etc. Other research examines how 
broader social factors impact angel markets. Here, research investigates gender differences in the 
supply of angel capital, noting the existence of systematic differences in how male and female 
angels both allocate funds and network with others within the marketplace (Harrison & Mason, 
2007). Ding et al. (2015) examine country-level differences in social trust, finding that countries 
with higher levels of social trust reflect heighted levels of angel investment.  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The dynamic nature of venture financing continues to challenge existing paradigms and 
create new research opportunities. Following the above review outline, we now discuss 
promising research opportunities, starting with VC.    
Directions for Future VC Research 
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Although VC research is the most mature segment of research in the equity financing 
literature, important questions remain. The inherent uncertainty of VC decision-making has led 
multiple researchers to probe VC decision processes and evaluation criteria. While important 
advancements have been made in this area, much of this progress focuses on decision processes 
of individual VCs or individual VC firms. However, in practice, VCs generally share risk by 
syndicating investments and VC decision making tends to be a collective effort. Thus, a more 
socialized perspective both within and across VC firms is merited.  
Within firms, how are existing assumptions about individual VC decision making challenged 
or changed when viewing the process as a collection of interacting decision makers? Funds 
commonly utilize investment committees to make final decisions regarding potential 
investments. Decision-by-committee can help decision-makers offset the negative influences of 
individual biases. However, just as decisions to terminate an investment are influenced by 
political dynamics (Guler, 2007), social influences may also impact initial funding decisions and 
subsequent interactions with portfolio companies. This leaves open questions about how VCs 
vary in their group decision-making processes, internal social dynamics, and behavioral risk-
taking and how this shapes the identification and development of portfolio companies. Across 
partnering VC firms, how do syndicate dynamics influence VC investment decisions? At a 
minimum, social dynamics within syndicates can affect follow-on funding, and the prevalence of 
investment syndicates suggests social dynamics across firms deserve much greater attention.  
Future research needs to move beyond the under-socialized perspective represented in many 
existing studies. Drawing on perspectives involving team mental models/schemas (e.g., 
Mohammed et al., 2010) group decision processes (e.g., Barsade, 2002), social cues (Banerjee, 
1992) or more theory on teams, groups, and social dynamics is needed for a better understanding 
of VC decision making.  The VC setting can also be useful in testing boundary conditions 
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associated with these team, group, and social dynamics theories, many of which have largely 
been examined within a firm’s boundaries; in the VC context, these interactions occur both 
within and across firm boundaries. 
 Relatedly, despite the central role of power dynamics established in other relational dyads, 
few articles have explored the role of power in shaping VC investment activities. Although 
research has explored how the bargaining power of VCs influences both their relationship with 
firms and firm valuation, venture financing research is just starting to explore how power and 
political influences shape the functioning and structure of VC syndicates (Ma et al., 2013). 
Power dynamics likely influence both access to VC syndicates, the allocation of shares across 
syndicate partners, and how lead VCs and other parties sanction or reward syndicate partners. 
The role of power dynamics is also likely to increase in importance as VC investing becomes 
more international and crosses institutional and cultural boundaries (Batjargal, 2007). In 
addition, though social theory tends to define power negatively, the use of power by investors 
and entrepreneurs does not always generate conflict, but instead can produce favorable outcomes 
for both parties (Hallen et al., 2014) and can be utilized in a variety of ways (Fleming & Spicer, 
2014) such as in providing social defenses for nascent firms. Thus, a pluralistic approach in 
future research to interorganizational power extending beyond resource or power dependence 
approaches, exploring both the negative and positive uses of power (e.g., soft power – Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009), are important topics. 
 The widespread use of syndication networks suggests multiple agency issues that VCs face 
as well as the potential for knowledge transfer among the companies within a VC’s portfolio 
and/or the portfolio of syndicate partners. The implications of these issues for follow-on funding, 
ways the VC interacts with portfolio companies that are increasing or decreasing in value relative 
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to other investments, and opportunities for the portfolio company to obtain new sources of 
knowledge and funding are important topics that deserve further consideration. 
 Next, because VCs are firms comprised primarily of knowledge assets, they present a rich 
context in which to examine boundary conditions of existing strategy theory that has been 
developed based on firms with a portfolio of knowledge assets as well as tangible assets. While 
several studies have used this context to reevaluate the corporate effects (e.g., Fitza et al., 2009) 
and diversification (Matusik & Fitza, 2012) literature and findings, many opportunities remain 
for using this context better to refine strategy theory. 
  One major trend within the VC arena we discussed is the increasing internationalization of 
VC investment activity. While both formal and informal institutional environments influence the 
VC activities (Gu & Lu, 2014), much more research is needed to disentangle the influences of 
formal and informal institutional factors on VC investment activities, particularly in developing 
contexts. Much of this work largely assumes there is an optimal configuration of formal and 
informal institutions conducive to VC investment; Bruton et al. (2010) indicate that this is not the 
case. Different institutional contexts may require different types of investors and investor 
behaviors. Instead of focusing on how closely the institutions in different countries align with 
those in the dominant VC market (i.e., the U.S.), there are opportunities to identify alternative 
configurations for risk capital markets that may fit with different institutional heritages.    
Additionally, complex institutional environments create an interesting set of opportunities 
and challenges that have not been widely explored. Unique formal and informal institutional 
arrangements around the world increase the complexity of managing global VC activities.  
Additionally, VCs are carriers of institutional logics (cf. Almandoz, 2014), so VC actions can 
shape how entrepreneurial ecosystems evolve and develop with consequential implications for 
country-level economic growth. Along these same lines, often the category-breaking outlier 
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firms funded by VCs play a role in disrupting and creating novel institutional arrangements. How 
VCs engage in institutional work to complement these efforts to create, sustain, and disrupt 
institutional arrangements remains an open question. Certain VCs are public figures and actively 
utilize their visibility not just to promote portfolio companies, but to challenge the prevailing 
institutional consensus openly and envision alternative institutional arrangements. These 
activities are worthy of further attention.   
Directions for Future CVC Research 
CVC research has the potential to advance our understanding of key issues in 
entrepreneurship and strategy. A notable feature of CVC—versus other players in the market for 
entrepreneurial finance—is that it is part of very large (and often global) corporations. As such, 
the study of CVC brings together theories across the fields of strategy, entrepreneurship and 
finance. This affords unique insights into the micro-foundations of strategy and the management 
of innovation and technology as well as corporate strategy and governance.  
To date, much of the CVC work is focused on answering the narrow question of the impact 
of CVC investing of firm patenting output (often, with some contingencies around CVC existing 
portfolio). Going forward, CVC research may generate deeper insights into the antecedents of 
CVC as well as the consequences to the parent firm and other key stakeholders (e.g., startups and 
independent VCs). First, CVC work can also draw on—and contribute to—theories on corporate 
strategy and governance. Why do large firms choose to invest in external startups directly, rather 
than empower their shareholders to do so independently? How and why should they organize 
their corporate venturing activities? More research is needed to explore why structural 
differences exist across CVC firms and funds. Whereas independent VC funds are largely 
homogeneous in structure and objective, that is not the case with CVCs. Future work should shed 
light on both the rationale behind and consequences of these differential structures.  
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Second, and along these lines, there is room to expand our conceptualization of CVCs’ 
overall strategic objective. Whereas exposure to novel technology is an important strategic 
objective, it is not the only one, and firms likely engage CVC investments to accomplish a broad 
range of strategic objectives. More research is needed to explore these different objectives and to 
understand both when CVCs choose to invest in other firms and when they choose to terminate 
these investments. Doing so can offer significant insights into the emerging management of 
technology and innovation. 
Third, the practice of CVC is no longer the prerogative of a handful of West-Coast based 
corporations. Today, corporate investors are active in almost every continent, including areas 
that have not traditionally been considered as innovation hubs. As CVC becomes more 
international, the same challenges we highlight above stemming from institutional complexity 
will undoubtedly influence these outcomes.  
Finally, management scholars have been increasingly exploring the microfoundations of 
strategy and competitive advantage (Felin et al., 2015). At the heart of the microfoundations 
conversations are debates regarding the role of human resources in strategic management 
processes (Felin et al., 2015). CVC provides an intriguing setting to explore these questions since 
CVC phenomena extend firm-level innovation strategies beyond the boundaries of a firm to 
source new ideas through investment in other organizations. CVC activities also influence the 
nature and scope of a firm’s alliance strategy. At the same time, emerging evidence suggests that 
the background characteristics (Dokko & Gaba, 2012; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014) and 
mindsets/investment rationales of CVCs influence these activities. Thus, in a sense, CVC 
practices expand the scope of the firm to engage in knowledge-sourcing strategies that expand 
the firm beyond its traditional boundaries, and individual-level variables likely play a significant 
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role in these decisions. More research is needed to explore how these firm boundaries decisions 
are enacted, and individual-level variables will clearly be important to these studies. 
Directions for Future Angel Research 
Despite an impact that closely rivals or even exceeds formal VC and CVC in the field, 
research on angel investing remains comparatively sparse (Huang & Pearce, 2015; Kerr et al., 
2014). It follows that many opportunities exist for scholars to bolster our understanding of this 
lesser-studied area of venture financing. Doing so, it is first important to highlight a point of 
distinction that often goes overlooked in existing research. Angel investors are generally 
clustered together, but in practice, different types of angel investment exist. These differences 
bring with them important theoretical and empirical considerations. For instance, independent 
angels invest on their own, but they can vary from being a novice to fairly sophisticated. Some 
angels make only a handful of investments while others are much more advanced (“super” or 
“serial” angels) making hundreds of investments. Moreover, angel groups are also growing 
rapidly, introducing yet another dimension for possible inquiry. Thus, we see that the 
motivations for investing, approaches to investment decisions, managing portfolios, and potential 
for value-add are just a few areas where inherent differences are likely to manifest across angel 
investors. Key to productive and meaningful advancements is consistent recognition and 
appreciation of inherent differences across sources of angel funding.   
Bearing this in mind, several opportunities exist within this dynamic area of investment. 
Research on independent angel investment decisions continues to identify how angel investors 
make decisions and the criteria with which they evaluate potential deals. What makes this area so 
interesting is that extant research indicates that given the paucity of concrete data to rely on at 
the venture’s earliest stages, angels are more likely to use intuitive decision-making processes 
(Huang & Pearce, 2015). Heuristic-based reasoning is most observable and perhaps most 
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effective when embedded within executive control (cognitive) systems that are largely formed 
through prior experiences (Mitchell et al., 2005). Additionally, angels have multiple motives and 
broad experiences that influence their decision-making. More explicit attention to these issues 
and how they affect decision making is warranted.  
Additionally, angel groups are proliferating across the globe. Looking at investment 
decisions within angel groups is likely to involve additional paradigms. Multiple investors are 
often making evaluations in concert, bringing a host of critical social structures and dynamics 
absent in independent angel evaluations. As noted with VC decision-making, a more socialized 
approach may also have relevance for angel groups. How interactions across group members, or 
a collective approach, shapes angel group investment decisions is critical to advancing decision 
making in this emerging space. Moreover, structural and strategic differences among angel 
groups are also important to consider. Finally, researchers could begin to model variables that 
account for variance in group performance: virtual vs. in-person groups, group-level measures of 
members (collective experience or prestige), geographic proximity, due diligence and 
syndication patterns. Linking different configurations of angel group characteristics, behaviors, 
and processes to longitudinal return performance remains a critically important line of inquiry.   
The dearth of angel research at the market level also provides many opportunities to examine 
the implications of recent changes in the angel landscape. For instance, the supply of in-person 
angel financing has tended to be geographically concentrated (e.g., 75%-80% of angel group 
investments are within their home region) (Halo Report, 2015), but the rapid year-over-year 
proliferation of in-person groups in new areas brings funding to locations that have been 
traditionally lacking. Also, the growth in online angel platforms challenges long-held geographic 
boundaries of in-person investing, and deals are receiving angel funding that cross borders in 
new ways. Together, the evolving dynamics of in-person and online angel funding are 
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profoundly shifting access to such capital. Research that probes the institutional forces and social 
networks (syndication) that govern these evolving funding sources should be beneficial. Market 
data is also needed that captures performance across different types of angel investment activity.  
Directions for Emerging Financing Mechanisms 
VC has historically dominated venture finance research, despite VCs funding less than ¼ of 
1% of all new ventures (Kaplan & Lerner, 2015). As new forms of entrepreneurial financing, 
such as equity crowdfunding and accelerators are emerging, greater attention to other funding 
sources is important for a fuller understanding of high-growth potential financing. While such 
inquiry is likely to become vital, we urge scholars to build from what we have already learned 
from 30+ years of venture financing research. As our review makes clear, a rich tradition of 
research has generated key insights around the funding process. Existing theories and 
approaches, such as agency theory, information economics, network theory, social dynamics and 
cognition, can aid in informing emerging funding sources. More explicitly, how do emerging 
sources complement or challenge existing theories and assumptions, such as traditionally held 
geographic assumptions and value-add dynamics? Advances are sure to be accelerated when 
studying emerging sources within the larger landscape of existing venture financing research.  
Equity Crowdfunding. With regard to crowdfunding, our focus here is on the equity side. 
Emerging platforms are beginning to have a significant impact, thus creating important research 
opportunities (Agrawal et al., 2016; Ahlers et al., 2015; Vulkan et al., 2016). Notably, equity 
crowdfunding changes the dispersion of ownership from that of traditional venture investing: 
equity crowdfunding shifts power to the entrepreneur by replacing a handful of larger outside 
investors with a multitude of many smaller ones. Both finance and management scholars have 
expressed concern about the tradeoffs of ownership dispersion in a variety of organizational 
settings (e.g., access to a wider pool of financing but with greater agency costs). In our view, the 
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dispersion of ownership via crowdfunding are likely to advance both theory and practice. 
Traditional agency theoretic approaches to corporate governance and incentive alignment may be 
challenged, with important implications for long vs. short term orientations, innovation 
behaviors, and capability development. Related management research explores how the role of 
structural embeddedness enables governance mechanisms to work to mitigate opportunism in 
complex network environments (Jones et al., 1997). The role of structural embeddedness, 
however, is unclear in equity crowdfunding environments as the coalitions of funding agents are 
more ad hoc and temporary. Exploring alternative governance mechanisms in equity 
crowdfunding stands as an important avenue for future research. 
A central component of crowdfunding is that it takes place in virtual settings. Prospective 
investors typically watch pitch videos and elect to invest over the internet (Mollick, 2014). This 
raises important questions about the differences and parallels to other classes of investors and 
how they evaluate opportunities. Many platforms explicitly utilize social proof or other signaling 
mechanisms to establish the legitimacy of new ventures. Since due diligence can be difficult and 
limited in virtual environments, are there key differences in how these signals function, such as 
highly visible contagion effects or herding behaviors? From the perspective of the entrepreneur, 
what role do aspects of communication, such as video design and structure, play in shaping 
investor behavior? Theories of attentional control and communication will likely be useful lenses 
through which to view and understand such behaviors. In addition, new methodological 
approaches from fields such as information management (e.g., eye tracking software) may offer 
new windows into the underpinnings of visual dynamics and investment likelihood.  
Further, for equity crowdfunding investors, how do their motives affect the application of 
traditional theory related to portfolio diversification and risk management? To this point, 
crowdfunding tends to come from funders who are within the network of those seeking funding. 
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As equity crowdfunding grows, how will the increase of investors with more traditional financial 
motives alter these early norms? Furthermore, given the newness of crowdfunding, the decision 
practices among crowdfunders is still opaque and probably evolving as less sophisticated 
investors move up this new learning curve.  
Accelerators. The rapid emergence of accelerators also presents new research opportunities. 
Accelerators are an organizational innovation with several attractive features (Shane, 2016; 
Hathaway, 2016). The study of accelerators would be aided by research conducted at various 
levels. For example, at a more macro-level, accelerators seem to exert a powerful regional 
impact: “We see a shift in funding for startups in accelerator-treated regions: more deals, more 
dollars, and more local investment groups. This applies to startups that attend the accelerator and 
those that do not” (Hochberg & Fehder, 2015, p.1202). Further unpacking the positive and 
negative regional and economic impact of accelerators could be very beneficial.  
Study of accelerators as organizational forms is needed as well. The structures and 
approaches most effective in influencing startup performance, as well as the distinct decision 
processes that go into optimizing cohort selection, are important future avenues of research. 
Moreover, what are the metrics for success? How do inter-startup dynamics (within cohorts) and 
networks influence startup development and success? In addition, acceleration is unlikely to 
benefit all entrepreneurs equally. Drawing on human capital theory (cf. Dimov & Shepherd, 
2005), it is plausible to theorize that variations across entrepreneurs will influence the efficacy of 
the acceleration process. For example, do less experienced entrepreneurs reap more 
performance-related benefits from accelerators than their more experienced counterparts?  
The acceleration process offers a unique window into the process of entrepreneurial learning. 
Entrepreneurial learning scholars have noted the need for a much better understanding of the 
dynamic relationships between mind, environment, and entrepreneurial action and have called 
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for research to probe the interactions of different variables of cognitive interest across levels of 
analysis (Grégoire et al., 2011). Yet, collecting data for such research often proves difficult. 
Accelerators offer an accessible, natural lab setting to study entrepreneurial learning in action. 
Directions for Future Research Across Forms of Financing 
Venture Financing Methodology. The study of venture financing calls for a fundamental 
re-evaluation of theory and research methodology. Venture investments do not often evenly yield 
significant investment returns, and data suggest only a few investments generate the lion’s share 
of industry returns (e.g., Cochrane, 2005). Understanding outcomes of entrepreneurial financing, 
then, revolves around identifying rare events and events that have extreme outcomes. The 
widespread use of correlational methods designed to estimate “average returns” can, however, 
yield misleading results since the average across a sample is influenced strongly by the extreme 
outliers. Whereas the tendency to remove extreme outliers in OLS models might aid researchers 
in finding significant results, much of the information of interest to equity financing researchers 
is represented by the outliers. Altering both our conceptual models and methodological tools to 
account for extreme outcomes is an important task for future research. 
There have been multiple calls for scholars to consider the distributions of the events they are 
studying in order to better model and draw conclusions from their work (e.g., Starbuck, 2016; 
Sornett & Ouillon, 2012), considering, for example, power laws or Pareto distributions when 
examining rare and impactful events. With such an approach, scholars studying investment 
decisions, for example, may change how they view investment decision making—becoming less 
about the criteria that maximize returns of one opportunity and more about the evaluative 
strategies used to realize a small handful of wins in the midst of a larger, inevitable tranche of 
losses. The notion of affordable losses in effectuation theory (Dew et al., 2009) might provide 
useful conceptual tools for understanding investor decision-making. Adopting such an approach, 
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versus a focus on isolated investment criteria, challenges and has the potential to advance theory 
that can improve empirical modeling and our understanding of VC investment activities. 
Interconnectedness Among Funding Sources. The growth of funding alternatives has 
several implications when considered alongside one another. Most studies consider funding 
sources in isolation, but as the landscape evolves, considering their interconnectedness becomes 
increasingly important. That is, shifting research designs and theoretical perspectives from 
isolated focus on one mechanism to considering the interrelated or simultaneous presence of 
others stands as an important shift going forward. Entrepreneurs have historically had few 
options for high-growth funding, but their increasing choice set has important implications: The 
growing options may give more power to entrepreneurs to select, negotiate and manage ongoing 
relations with investors. How the entrepreneur’s expanding choice set challenges and changes 
traditional assumptions, dynamics and theories remains an understudied area of inquiry.  
Moreover, the emergence of different entrepreneurial funding sources presents situations in 
which participants can be friends and/or foes (cf. Hellman & Thiele, 2015). We view it as an 
important undertaking to deconstruct further the nuances of these relational dynamics. For 
example, regarding complementary relations (e.g., friends), some extant work suggests that 
accelerator activity increases subsequent VC activity (Hochberg & Fehder, 2015), and higher 
volumes of reward-based crowdfunding investors or the investment of a reputable angel group 
can result in more favorable VC evaluations (Drover et al., 2017). Such findings begin shedding 
light on the various ways in which funding sources may work together, potentially serving as 
new avenues of deal flow and certification for later-stage investors. Thus, research is needed to 
identify how earlier-stage funding mechanisms communicate positive signals to other 
prospective investors and stakeholders (Ahlers et al., 2015). On the other hand, in regard to 
adversary relationships (or foes), other work suggests funding models may compete or challenge 
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one another: “The data show that equity crowdfunding will likely pose great challenges to VC 
and business angel financiers in the near future” (Vulkan et al., 2016, p. 1). The evolving 
relations are complex and conditional, but the implications within and across funding models 
introduce an important frontier; central to understanding the modern funding landscape is its 
increasingly interconnected nature. Emerging research on co-opetition in strategy (e.g., Gnyawali 
& Park, 2011) may prove useful in understanding the evolving equity financing process.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The capitalization of new ventures is one of the most foundational issues of entrepreneurship 
and the launch of high-growth ventures. In a manner consistent with the variability and 
importance of attaining funding, an impressive number of studies have explored a multiplicity of 
aspects and outcomes of venture financing over the past several decades. While much of this 
work has focused on VC; models from this work are increasingly spilling over into the study of 
angel investment, CVC, crowdfunding and accelerators. Together, this body of work is growing 
and we see many opportunities for future work. This review has brought attention to the largely 
under-socialized perspective represented across this literature, and we encourage researchers to 
identify and study important sources of heterogeneity among equity investors, as well as 
important interactions across these different categories of investors. Emerging forms of equity 
financing, such as crowdfunding and accelerators, underscore the criticality of broadening our 
scope of inquiry to understand the entrepreneurial financing landscape in its entirety—parceling 
out where established theory is still relevant and where new theory needs to be forged. Going 
forward, careful theorizing accompanied by well-designed empirical studies are essential to 
probing how changes in practice and our theoretical understanding of this domain can co-evolve. 
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Summary of VC, CVC and Angel Research  
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Venture Capital    
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Drover, Wood & Zacharakis, (2017) 
Murnieks, Haynie, Wiltbank, & Harting (2011) 
47 
Organizational Alleviating problems with asymmetric information in financial markets. 
 
The value added by VC and performance outcomes for entrepreneurial firms.  
 
Mitigating risk and contact mechanisms (e.g., multi-stage investment vehicles mechanisms, stock 
options, covenants, types of securities). 
Sahlman (1990) 
Megginson & Weiss (1991) 
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Stuart, T. E., Hoang, H., & Hybels (1999) 
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu (2007)  
Kaplan & Strömberg (2004) 
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Market  How macro level factors shape actions and outcomes (e.g., market entry, screening processes, 
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CVC    
Individual  CVC personnel and mindset. 
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Organizational Economic and behavioral antecedents of CVC.  
The CVC unit within a given firm.  
 
CVC performance outcomes. 
 
Considerations and performance outcomes from the entrepreneurial firm’s perspective.  
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Park & Steensma (2012) 
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Market  Trends in CVC investment activity. 
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Sahaym, Steensma, & Barden (2010) 
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Angel Investment     
Individual  Individual angel investor’s decisions to invest. 
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Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque (2011) 
Maxwell & Lévesque (2014) 
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Organizational Decision making within angel groups.  
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Carpentier & Suret (2015) 
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